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Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and
the Right to Treatment
The state normally cannot imprison an individual until it has shown
beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed a specific illegal act;
the criminal process is farther hedged round by strict procedural
limitations. The scarcely less awesome power to incarcerate for reasons
other than conviction has not been subjected to similarly rigorous
scrutiny, either substantive or procedural.1 Yet today thousands of
people are restrained under a variety of statutes for reasons other than
conviction for crime. The rise of the rehabilitative ideal in this country
has meant a strong trend toward the use of civil restraint systems as an
alternative to the ordinary criminal process. Two grounds, seldom
clearly distinguished from one another in statutes and judicial opinions,
support this civil confinement. The most frequently asserted ground
is society's right, if not duty, to commit for treatment people so men-
tally disordered as to be unable to decide whether to seek treatment
themselves.2 The second rationale is preventive detention: some per-
sons are adjudged so dangerous that they must be restrained to protect
society or themselves, even though they have not committed any
criminal act with the traditionally required mens rea.
Prevention detention sounds bad; it conflicts with our traditions and
seems constitutionally dubious. Our natural reaction is that if we are
to allow such restraint at all the occasions for it must be carefully de-
fined-as the elements of a crime usually are-and it must be imple-
mented under procedures which assure careful protection for the
rights of the person affected.
Treatment, on the other hand, sounds good; when we restrain a man
to treat him, we act for his own benefit; we decide for him as we
assume he would decide for himself if he were of sound mind. With
benevolent intent assumed, definition of standards and procedural
protections seem less important.
1. Usually because that process is denominated civil instead of penal. See pp. 92.93
infra.
2. The venerable notion of parens patriae.
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For these reasons, statutes providing for civil confinement, and
judicial decisions interpreting them, have long stressed the treatment
aspect of such detention.' Unfortunately, the reality of the treatment
afforded those confined as insane persons, sexual psychopaths, and de-
fective delinquents does not always reflect the asserted benevolent in-
tentions.
Much of the care received today in our gigantic state mental insti-
tutions is merely custodial.4 Most of these institutions are woefully
overcrowded and include within their walls many senile patients and
others who could be more effectively cared for elsewhere if society
wanted to provide for themY Complicating the situation still further is
a severe and continuing manpower shortage, which includes both
psychiatrists and other personnel such as psychologists, nurses, social
workers, and attendants.6 Our state mental hospitals have not attracted
a sufficient number of trained psychiatrists, who often feel greater
professional satisfaction and earn higher incomes in private practice.
3. See p. 92 infra.
4. The body of literature critical of American mental hospitals is Immense. See, e.g,,
Hearings on S. 755 & 756 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comns. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearings on H.R. 3688, 3689 &- 2567 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963); A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948); JOINT COMISSION ON MEN rAL
ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH: FINAL REPORT 3-23 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as AcTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH].
There is little doubt that, for many mentally disturbed individuals, institutionalization
without real treatment can actually result in a worsening of their mental disease. See
generally J. CUMMING & E. CUMMING, EGO AND MILIEU 83-105 (1963); E. GOFFIMAN, ASYLIMS
(1961). One commentator has even characterized the effects of institutionalization as so
severe that if the patient is not released within two years of his admission, the chances are
good that he will die in the hospital. Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Community-based los.
pital as a Branch of a State Hospital, 116 Am. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 814 (1960).
5. Approximately 30 per cent of state patients are 65 or over. ACrToN FOR MENTAL
HEALTH 175. See J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCnIAIrs" AND
LAW 554 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIlATRY AND LAW], Official, at a
large state hospital in New York City estimated that between 40 and 60 per cent of their
patients could be cared for with something less than full-day institutionalization, but that
the necessary community facilities are not yet available. Interviews at Bronx State Hospital,
April 1967. See also note 114 infra.
It should be noted in fairness that many state hospital systems are today in a period ot
rapid and far-reaching change, most of it for the better. This includes in-hospital develop.
ments, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 169, and those relating to other facilities. The trend
toward use of community mental health centers has been accelerated by the Community
Mental Health Centers Act of 1963, 42 U.&C. §§ 2681-87 (1964). These centers provide
treatment of mental disease without formal institutionalization, with a maximum of
program flexibility, and close to the patient's normal environment. Increased emphasis is
also being given to outpatient care coordinated with state hospitals, day-care, and after-care
programs to ease the often difficult transition back into the community. Halfway houses are
also being experimented with. On day-care, see Zwerling & Wilder, Day Hospital Treatment
for Psychotic Patients, in 2 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES 200 (j. Masserman ed, 1962),
For an example of a statute providing counseling services and home care rather than
hospital treatment, see CAL. WELFARE AND INSr'Ns CODE § 5568 (West 1966).
6. ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 140-65; G. ALBEE, MENTAL HEALTH MANFOWER TRNDS
(1959).
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A community attitude of fear and rejection of the mentally ill com-
plicates this recruitment problem.7
A recent District of Columbia case8 suggests that when society con-
fines a man on the asserted ground that he needs treatment, its lofty
purpose cannot then be forgotten-treatment must be provided.
Charles Rouse was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital under a Dis-
trict statute providing that a person found not guilty of a crime by
reason of insanity shall be summarily committed to a mental hospital.0
Three years later he sought his release on a petition for habeas corpus,
alleging that he was not receiving adequate treatment. The court of
appeals held that he had stated a legally sufficient claim and remanded
for a hearing on the adequacy of treatment.10 The decision depended
upon a statute providing that any person committed to a mental hos-
pital "shall ... be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treat-
7. See ACTION FOR MFNTAL HEALTH 56-85; G. GURIN, AsiERIrucNs VIEW THr rn M'.xrAL
HEAL (1960).
8. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The history of the case has become
somewhat complex. The 1966 decision remanded the case for another hearing in the district
court, which was held in January, 1967, with the district court determining that Rouse was
receiving treatment. Rouse appealed that decision, but also in April. 1967, brought another
habeas corpus petition, alleging that he had not voluntarily pleaded inanity at his initial
trial, and that the mandatory commitment section was unconstitutional. The court of
appeals held for Rouse on the first ground, citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 709 (1962).
and avoided the constitutional challenge. Rouse v. Cameron, No. 20.962 (D.C. Cir.. Sept. 1.
1967) (en banc). The court filed a separate opinion on the appeal from the district court's
action, declaring the treatment issue moot in view of its disposition of the second petition.
Rouse v. Cameron, No. 20,881 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 1, 1967) (en bane) (per curiam).
Though the court of appeals may now not be anxious to expand the first Rouse opinion,
the decision still seems to be good law. Along with its action on Rouse's second petition,
the court in September, 1967, remanded two habeas corpus petitions for consideration of
the adequacy of treatment. Dobson v. Cameron, No. 20,563 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 1, 1907) (en
banc) (per curiam); Stultz v. Cameron, No. 20,576 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 1, 1967) (en bane) (per
curiam). Those cases concerned civil commitment, not mandatory commitment following
the insanity defense, but there is no reason to believe the court's attitude would be different
for the latter route.
9. If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or tried in
the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is acquitted solely on
the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, the court shall order
such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961).
10. The court also remanded a companion case for findings on treatment, holding that
the right applied to those committed under the District's sexual ps)chopath statute.
Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Rouse had also contended that he was not mentally ill. The opinion expressed concern
with the extent to which the offense for which Rouse was arrested, carrying a dangerous
weapon, influenced the judge's decision on dangerousness, 373 F.2d at 459-60, and remanded
for clarification of that issue as well. Judge Danalier dissented on the ground that the
treatment issue was not before the court, because Rouse's major contention was that he
was sane and needed no care. Judge Danaher did not discuss the constitutional arguments
for a right to treatment in detail, but his opposition to court supervision of treatment has
become dear. 373 F.2d at 462-67 (dissenting opinion); Rouse v. Cameron, No. 20 92 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 1, 1967) at 9-11. Judge Fahy concurred, but wrote a separate opinion directed at
Danaher's arguments concerning Rouse's assertion of his sanity. 373 F_7d at 461-62.
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ment." But, more significantly, the court ranged beyond the statute to
hint at the possible constitutional infirmities of confinement without
treatment.' 2
First, Judge Bazelon noted the lack of procedural safeguards atten-
dant upon Rouse's commitment. Such informality was permissible
because of the "humane therapeutic goals" of commitment for treat-
11. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966). [The provision appears as section 9(b) of
the 1964 District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally I11 Act, reprinted In pertl.
nent part in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 488-93.] The court's statutory interpreta.
tion seems at best doubtful. The opinion seems finally to rest upon the argument that while
many of the provisions are specifically restricted to "mentally ill persons," a category which
excludes those committed by courts in criminal proceedings, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 (Supp.
V, 1966), the treatment provision is not. Though there is much in the debates over the
Act to indicate that Congress wished to provide a right to treatment, there are also Indi.
cations that it meant the concept to apply only to non-criminal cases. See, e.g., 110 CONa,
REc. 21345 (1964) (remarks of Senator Ervin). The whole section of the Act of which
§ 21-562 is a part was specifically limited to such cases.
Judge Danaher pointed out some of the difficulties of statutory interpretation in hi
dissent, 373 F.2d at 466 n.12. Doubts about the correctness of its reading of section 21-562
apparently prompted the court to add a supplementary footnote to its opinion, hi. at 454l
n.18a, which argued in effect that the plain language of the statute took precedence over
the doubtful legislative history. It also hinted that any differences in treatment between
criminally and civilly committed persons, if found on the face of the statute, might render
it unconstitutional under Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). This Commtnt argtleg
that as long as sufficient safeguards are provided, dangerousness provides a rationial bashs
for different disposition, though the simple label "criminal" does not. See pp. 98.100 inlra,
The Rouse opinion also noted that ten states recognize a right to treatment in some form
by statute. 373 F.2d at 455 & n.21. Examination of these provisions, however, indicates that
none has established a separate right to treatment assertable on habeas corpus. Like the
D.C. provisions, they are typically not a part of any particular commitment procedure, but
rather express the overall aim or hope of the statute. The most frequently used section 1s
that found in the Draft Act, providing that a patient is entitled to treatment "to the extent
that facilities, equipment, and personnel are available." NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, DRAFr ACT GOVERNING HosPrrALIzATIoN OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 9 (Public Health
Service Pub. No. 51, rev'd ed. 1952) reprinted in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Tim MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, app. A, at 404 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE]. The quoted language was omitted In the
D.C. Act; section 21-562 otherwise closely resembles the Draft Act section.
12. Though constitutional grounds had not been previously spelled out, the D.C. Court
of Appeals had spoken of a possible right to treatment in earlier cases. Judge Fahy had
perhaps been the first to mention it in his concurrence in Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d
943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). While concurring on the question of the constitutionality of the
mandatory commitment law, he said:
p his mandatory commitment provision rests upon a supposition, namely, the necessity
or treatment of the mental condition which led to the acquittal by reason of Insanity.
And this necessity for treatment presupposes in turn that treatment will be accorded.
Id. at 950. In Darnell v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court made it clear that
it would consider right to treatment arguments:
We are constrained to note this question here because the District Court did not recog.
nize that the alleged absence of treatment might draw into question "the constitution.
ality of the mandatory commitment section" as applied to appellant. This question
may be explored if raised in subsequent proceedings.
Id. at 67-68 (footnote omitted). In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane),
the court considered treatment alternatives for an aged patient, remanding for an Inquiry
into the possibility of more appropriate treatment than confinement at St. Elizabeth's hos.
pital. For the events following the first Rouse decision in the court of appeals, sce notes 8
supra and 97 infra. There are presently a number of cases pending in the District of
Columbia courts examining the implications of the right to treatment.
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ment; but if treatment was not in fact provided, Bazelon suggested that
"a full range of procedural safeguards might be constitutionally re-
quired."'13 Second, he pointed out that Rouse could have been sen-
tenced to no more than one year in prison if found guilty of the crime
for which he was charged.' 4 Having been found not guilty by reason of
insanity, he was committed to St. Elizabeth's for an indefinite term.
The disparity of disposition if not justified by actual treatment raised
equal protection questions. Finally, Judge Bazelon toyed with the
possibility that "[i]ndefinite confinement without treatment of one
who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as
to be 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "Ili
The Rouse dicta have signal importance in suggesting new consti-
tutional grounds for challenge of institutional confinement when ade-
quate treatment is not provided. 0 They may force a re-evaluation of
the trend toward "civil" forms of restraint. Moreover, to the extent
that adequate treatment may become a constitutional touchstone for
confinement, the decision raises the difficult problems courts will face
in administering a right to treatment.
I. Commitment Laws and Their Bases
Judge Bazelon's constitutional suggestions-that confinement with-
out treatment either is wholly invalid or requires quasi-criminal safe-
guards-demand firm distinctions between the two bases of civil
confinement which are not made by existing legislation. Legislative
and judicial formulations often muddle the two justifications for con-
13. 373 F.2d at 453 n.9. It is not completely clear that Bazelon would approve an inter-
pretation of his opinion which would allow restraint for dangerousness without the promise
of treatment, as advocated in this Comment. The quoted portion sens to indicate that
he would, if procedures were stricter. Footnote 18a, added later, as we have seen, hints at
equal protection problems if the right is not extended to all committed persons. The
latter may, however, be a result of his defensive position on the statutory interpretation
question. See note 11 supra.
14. 373 F.2d at 453.
15. Id. (footnote omitted).
16. The notion of a specific right to adequate treatment first gained notice in the
1960's. See, e.g., Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); M. Bassiouni,
The Right of the Mentally Il to Cure and Treatment: Medical Due Process, 15 DEPAUL
L. REv. 291 (1966). Both authors seem to base the right on substantive due process, and do
not discuss the differing bases for commitment. See also S. RumN. PsYcHIATRv ANO CRIMINAL
LAW: ILLusioxs, FxarsoN AND MY-TsS, ch. 7 (1965); Birnbaum, Some Comments on the Right
to Treatment, 13 ARCH. OF GEN. PsvCHuT"R 34 (1966).
The Rouse decision has already brought forth numerous comments on the right to
treatment. Comment, Due Process for All: Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil
Commitment and Release, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 633, 636-54; Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967); 16 Am1. U.L. REv. 307 (1967); 80 HA,'. L. RE,. 598
(1967); 45 TExAs L. REv. 777 (1967).
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finement into a confused melange, adopting "treatment" language to
approve procedural informality and turning to the rationale of pre-
ventive detention when treatment is impossible or unavailable.
A. Civil Commitment
The most important method of involuntary restraint for mental
disorder is civil commitment under the various state laws, descended
from the centuries-old lunacy law common to almost all countries.
These laws reflect a welter of historically superimposed purposes,
rarely distinguished from each other in practice.1 7
An American Bar Foundation study of these statutes in 1961 found
that in five states involuntary commitment of a mentally ill person
was based on dangerousness to himself or others; in twelve the need
for care and treatment could be an alternative ground; in seven the
need for care and treatment was the only basis; and in seven hospi-
talization could occur only where the welfare of the individual or of
others justified it. Six states furnished no statutory criteria, and Massa-
chusetts permitted confinement in cases of "social nonconforinity."18
These criteria, presumably reflecting the purposes of confinement,
are often treated as though there were no differences among them.
Civil commitment acts themselves never suggest that procedural re-
quirements might depend on the reason for commitment.19 Similarly,
judicial discussion of the purpose of civil commitment, usually in re-
17. In its earliest development, confinement was primarily for the protection of so-
ciety, but as medical knowledge increased and rehabilitation therapy developed more
and more emphasis has been placed on the restoration of the subject to normal life
free from the stigma of a criminal record.
Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).[SJince mental hospitals, in some places at least, have come to be therapeutic as well as
custodial institutions, many jurisdictions have extended coverage of commitment
statutes to those who need care and treatment for their own welfare whether or not
there is any danger in permitting them to be at liberty.
Leavy, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Connecticut Law 44 (1966). See
generally A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949); Note, Civil Commit-
ment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1160, 1164-68 (1967).
18. LINDMA & MCINTYRE 17-18.
19. On commitment procedures, see LINDMAN & MCINTYRE 49-75. State provisions vary
from judicialized procedures like those of D.C. to the medical certification used in New
York. Many psychiatrists, concerned because of the supposed traumatic effects of hearingi
and jury trials on a mentally disturbed person, favor freer medical certification, while many
lawyers and civil liberties groups favor safeguards close to those of the criminal process.
See generally AssocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMINrIT.r TO
STUDY COIMMIENT PROCEDURES; MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS (1962); Kittrie, Com.
pulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 Oto ST. L.J. 28
(1960); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 Micit, L,
REV. 945 (1959); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
IHAv. L. REv. 1288 (1966); Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involun.
tary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 633 (1967).
Vol. 77: 87, 1967
Right to Treatment
buttal to attacks on a lack of procedural safeguards, rarely reflects any
sense that confinement based on the need for care might imply differ-
ent rights from confinement based on the individual's dangerousness.
Instead, courts have routinely repulsed all constitutional attack on the
uncritical reasoning that such laws are civil and rehabilitative rather
than penal.
B. Sexual Psychopath Laws
A relative newcomer among commitment laws is the so-called sexual
psychopath statute, singling out for special disposition and indeter-
minate custody a particular class of offenders, those who commit sex
crimes or engage in habitual sexual misconduct. The usual pattern is
for the court, either before or after a conviction, to require a psy-
chiatric examination of the person and to order indeterminate confine-
ment at a mental hospital if a finding of psychopathy is made. Some
laws do not require either an actual conviction or even a criminal
charge.2 0
Sexual psychopath laws vary in their definitions of to whom they
apply, but all the formulations are marked by a striking looseness of
terms.21 Like civil commitment laws, they are usually viewed as civil
when constitutionally attacked.2 2 And, again like civil commitment,
20. For a summary of these laws, see LINDMAN & McI-'nnE 319-26. Compare, e.g., CAL.
E.LFARE AND INSTNS CODE § 5501(a) (West 1966) with NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2902(1) (Supp.
1957).
21. Sexual psychopathy is not synonymous with insanity in the usual sense; there is
profound disagreement within the profession as to whether the condition is a mental dis-
ease, a personality disorder, or something else. The laws have been widely critized by both
lawyers and doctors. See Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical
Discussion, 43 CAIF. L. REV. 766 (1955); Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform. 33 U. On.
L. R v. 627, 637-44 (1966); Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Surnmary and Analysis,
51 J. Cmi. IC. & P.S. 215 (1960); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offender, FEDEnAL
PRoBATON, June, 1955, at 7; Comment, Sexual Psychopathy-A Legal Lab)rinth of fedi-
cine, forals, and Mythology, 36 NEB. L. REv. 320 (1957); Note, The Plight of the Sexual
Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 Nom DAmE Lw. 527
(1966). For a case where a change in staff definition of psychopathy at a mental hospital
after conviction resulted in a new trial, see Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (1959).
22. The laws have been upheld against challenges based on vagueness, due process, and
equal protection. The landmark case is Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940). See, e.g., Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Malone v.
Overholser, 93 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950); In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159
(1951); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 NAV.2d 18 (1942); State ex rel. Sweezer v.
Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1950); In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26 (1950).
See also Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
Commitment under a particular variety of sexual psychopath law, that coming into play
only after an ordinary conviction of a crime and at the discretion of the judge, has recently
been declared unconstitutional at least where a criminal-type hearing is lacking. In United
States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966), Penmsylvania's Barr-Walker
Act was involved. Under it the judge could order an indeterminate one-year-to-life sentence
after conviction if he found after a psychiatrist's report that the defendant ms a threat to
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they are indiscriminately rationalized by a stated need for societal pro-
tection or individual treatment, or both.
The protection interest is often mentioned. The District of Colum-
bia law, for example, has been interpreted as constituting "an exten-
sion of established law which relates to the commitment to hospitals
of persons who by reason of insanity or inability to control impulses
are dangerous to other persons." 23 The Michigan Supreme Court has
said that its act deals with those "who require confinement, treatment,
and care, both for their own protection and for the protection of the
public."24 The California courts have stated that the primary purpose
is to protect society, with a secondary aim of rehabilitation,5 and more
recently that "... the statutory scheme was not designed for the benefit
of the criminal defendant, but for the protection of society .
The need for treatment has also been stressed. Thus, the Missouri
Supreme Court emphasized the "future well-being and return to
normal living of a person so charged, '27 though it also recognized the
protective function.28 Similar emphasis on treatment has been made
by Michigan29 and New Hampshire courts.8 0
C. Defective Delinquent Laws
Closely related to the sexual psychopath laws are the defective de-
linquent statutes in force in some ten states.31 They do not require a
finding of insanity, but are based upon a finding of mental deficiency
or personality disorder which results in repeated criminal conduct.
Like the sexual psychopath laws, they have been vigorously but unsuc-
cessfully attacked as simple preventive detention based on vague psy-
the bodily safety of the public, or was mentally ill and a habitual offender. The court held
that this procedure did not satisfy due process:
The effort of enlightened penology to alleviate the condition of a convicted defendant
by providing some elements of advanced, modern methods of cure and rehabilitation
and possible ultimate release on parole cannot be turned about so as to deprive a de-
fendant of the procedures which the due process clause guarantees in a criminal
proceeding.
Id. at 310. In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), the Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion, noting that the situation was akin to the requirement of a hearing under
habitual offender acts, and not comparable to that in Pearson, supra, where there was a
full hearing on the psychiatric issues.
23. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
24. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 603-04, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26 (1942).
25. People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897, 902 (1957).
26. People v. Fuller, 226 Cal. App. 2d 331, 335, 38 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28 (1964).
27. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900 (1950).
28. Id. at 1256, 232 S.W.2d at 902.
29. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 368, 88 N.W.2d 470, 475 (1958).
30. In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 373, 77 A.2d 26, 28 (1950).
31. See M. PAuLsEN & S. KAmisu, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES 111 n.9 (1962).
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chiatric analysis.32 Here too the aims are confused, but with protection
occupying a pre-eminent place. The Fourth Circuit upheld Maryland's
recently-enacted law on its face, reserving the question whether it
could infringe basic rights as applied.33 The court explained that the
law was not strictly based on the need to treat the disordered person,
but rather on the desire to protect society and the individual con-
cerned.34
D. Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity
Twenty-nine states have laws requiring mandatory commitment fol-
lowing an acquittal by reason of insanity similar to the one at issue
in the Rouse case.3 5 Many other laws allow such commitment at the
discretion of the trial court. Judges have repeatedly upheld these
statutes as long as habeas corpus is available to challenge later the
key issues of continuing insanity and legality of commitment. 0 But
here too a dual objective emerges-treatment of the individual, and
protection of society and the accused from his actions.
This interest in protection is strikingly evident in the congressional
reaction to Durham v. United States.37 That decision, significantly
broadening the legal definition of insanity in the District of Columbia,
32. See, e.g., Gordon 8- Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the Defective Delin-
quent Statute in Massachusetts, 30 BosroN U.L. REv. 459 (1950).
33. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
Deficiencies in staff, facilities, and finances would undermine the efficacy of the Insti-
tution and the justification for the law, and ultimately the constitutionality of its
application.
Id. at 516-17. In response to the Fourth Circuit's mandate, the Mar)land courts then made
an extensive study of the statute in operation, upholding its constitutionality in all
respects, including the reasonableness of the basic definition of defective delinquency.
Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (196).
34. 334 F.2d at 513.
35. LIDmAN : McIrYva 353, chart at 378-85. Some states allow relaxation of the rule
and consequent release upon a specific finding of present sanity. Id. For a criticism of
mandatory commitment, see Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-
A Legal Lorelei, 49 GEo. L.J. 294 (1960).
36. E.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); People v. Dubina, 304
Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 766, petition for rehearing denied, 320 US.
811 (1943); Annot., 145 A.L.IR 892 (1943) (including a few cases where courts have declared
mandatory commitment statutes unconstitutional).
An important recent case in this field is People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654,
224 N.E.2d 87 (1966). The New York Court of Appeals upheld its mandatory commitment
statute, stating that it was reasonable to hold one who successfully pleads insanity in a
criminal trial. Surprisingly, however, the court sent the case back for a jury trial on the
dangerousness issue, as required in its view by the Equal Protection Clause. Thus in
New York there is little difference between civil commitment and commitment following a
successful insanity defense; the major one being that in the latter case the acquitted ac.
cused can be held in the interim (another may be burden of proof, upon which the Lally
opinion is unclear). The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected an opportunity to demand a
similar hearing under its mandatory commitment statute in cases discussed supra note 8.
37. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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was swiftly followed by a mandatory commitment law,38 the legislative
history of which makes it clear that Congress was concerned primarily
with the protection of society from those persons whose mental state
made them dangerous although not criminally responsiblea 9
The conceptual confusion involved in all the varieties of civil con-
finement laws40 arises from a failure to recognize and distinguish be-
tween the two distinct needs to which mental illness may give rise.
Protection of society and treatment for the individual of course can
and do overlap in many instances, but they are in theory different
justifications for confinement and respond to different variables. New
psychiatric knowledge may, for example, broaden the range of treat-
able persons without changing society's view of who is dangerous. Since
Rouse may eventually compel both courts and legislators to distin-
guish between these two needs and to set different standards for
society's response to each, an analysis of the treatment problem is
surely needed which does not abandon each difficult question by
abruptly invoking the need to protect society.
58. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961).
59. The enactment of § 24-301(d) in 1955 was the direct result of the change in the
standard of criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia wrought by Durham v,
United States .... That decision provoked a Congressional re-examination of the laws
governing commitment of the criminally insane.
Lynch v. Overholser, 869 U.S. 705, 715 (1962). A Committee on Mental Disorder as a
Criminal Defense had been organized and in its report had recommended a mandatory
commitment scheme:
[I1he public is entitled to know that, in every case where a person has committed a
crime as a result of mental disease or defect, such person shall be given a period of
hospitalization and treatment to guard against imminent recurrence of sonic criminal
act by that person.
The Committee believes that a mandatory commitment statute would add much to
the public's peace of mind, and to the public safety, without impairing the rights of
the accused.
S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955), H.R. REP. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
13 (1955). See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity De.
lense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 941-42 (1961).
Judge Bazelon has explained the reasons for not holding the mentally ill criminally
responsible and for committing them:
(1) It is both wrong and foolish to punish where there is no blame and punishment
cannot correct. (2) The community's security may be better protected by hospitaliza-
tion under ... [the mandatory commitment section] than by imprisonment.
Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (1957). Quite clearly, the right to treatment
and the expansion of the insanity defense are closely related. If the number of thoe ex-
culpated because of "sickness" is to be increased and the number of blameworthy decreased,
society must be able to offer treatment or the commitment will be tantamount to life
imprisonment for many. Thus the pressure for more adequate treatment is the cutting
edge of the trend toward liberalization of the insanity defense.
40. It should be noted that there are several other ways one can be involuntarily com-
mitted to a mental institution in the United States. Mental retardation, incompetency to
stand trial, narcotics addiction, alcoholism, and even epilepsy may in certain states in
certain circumstances lead to institutionalization. These other routes are not our primary
concern in this Comment, but they can be seen to suffer from the same confusion of
statutory purpose as do the types of commitment discussed supra.
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II. The Constitutional Arguments for the Right to Treatment
The Rouse opinion suggested two principal and one subsidiary con-
stitutional attacks on confinement without treatment,41 which differ
importantly in principle and effect. First, Judge Bazelon hinted that
indefinite civil confinement without treatment-that is, preventive
detention-may be so inhumane as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Second, a procedural twostep is suggested under the due
process clause: confinement for dangerousness is tolerated, but only
with rigorous procedural guarantees similar to those required in the
criminal process; confinement for treatment is allowed on more sum-
mary procedure, but only if treatment is genuinely provided.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The most fundamental assault on civil confinement statutes sug-
gested by Rouse is based on the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California.4 The California statute
challenged in Robinson made it a crime to "be addicted to the use of
narcotics." 43 The Court reasoned that a law making leprosy a crime
would universally be thought to involve cruel and unusual punish-
ment and concluded that "[w]e cannot but consider the statute before
us of the same category. " 44 The statute struck down explicitly made
addiction a crime, as well as prescribing confinement for it. The Court
did not hold that confinement was in itself punishment; indeed it
noted that a "state might determine that the general health and wel-
fare require that victims of [mental disease, leprosy, or venereal dis-
ease] be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine,
confinement, or sequestration. " 45 This dictum does not give carte
blanche to civil commitment; it contains, albeit implicitly, the im-
portant limitation that permissible civil confinement is the confine-
41. 373 F.2d at 453.
42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, alluded to the parallel
with psychiatric treatment:
If addicts can be punished for their addiction, then the insane can be punished for
their insanity. Each has a disease and each must be treated as a sick person.
Id. at 674.
43. Id. at 660.
44. Id. at 667. Prior to Robinson, it had been held that the public health laws relating
to communicable diseases could not be construed to permit detaining a tubercular injail.
Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Robinson has since been interpreted to
cover the jailing of persons for the status of alcoholism. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361
F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
45. 370 U.S. at 666. The California courts later upheld involuntary commitment for
addiction under Ch. 850 §§ 2, 3 f1961] CA. STAT. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
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ment required for treatment. It is unlikely that a general locking up
of diseased persons could escape the strictures of Robinson by simply
being labelled "civil" confinement. In more than one decision, includ-
ing the recent Gault46 case, the Court has looked behind the label to
find the functional equivalent of imprisonment in nominally "civil"
confinement.
On one reading of Robinson, then, the Court could find all confine-
ment for mental disorder to be "cruel and unusual punishment" unless
accompanied by treatment. Such a reading has deep attractions, rooted
in the hostility of our law and tradition to preventive detention with-
out a criminal conviction and in the peculiarly repellent quality of
the notion that sick people can be immured and left to rot. Their
sickness may make them dangerous to the rest of us; but if they are to
be confined for a condition which they are neither responsible for nor
able to combat, there should be a reciprocal obligation for society to
attempt to help them.
This interpretation of Robinson is supported by the close resem-
blance of some civil confinement to imprisonment. Some institutions
for "defective delinquents" or the "criminally insane" lool like
prisons; they have bars, cells, and more burly guards than doctors and
therapists. 47 Civil confinement is for an indefinite term and may
amount to a life sentence in an institution little different from a prison.
However, practical problems render unlikely a full hardening into
constitutional requirements of the radical hints that can be found in
Robinson. Some dangerous and mentally disordered people are un-
treatable in our current state of knowledge; any doctrine which com-
pels that they be left free is of dubious viability.48 Further, although at
least ameliorative treatment is known for some kinds of mental dis.
order, neither enough public money nor sufficient personnel is avail-
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and cases cited notes 56-58 infra.
47. See generally Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason
of Insanity, 38 TExAs L. REV. 849 (1960). PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 700-02 coin-
pares in detail a prison and a "secure" mental hospital in Massachusetts, showing the
similarity of conditions.
48. Present laws, Robinson aside, seem to recognize this.
Inherent in the statutory scheme, whether we like it or not, is the proposition that
one who is "incurably insane" and "incurably dangerous"- if there are such-may be
hospitalized indefinitely.
Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 854 (1961). Two of the most astute commentators
have described the purpose of civil commitment as follows:
that "mentally ill" persons who evidence dangerousness to themselves or others be
provided by the state with custody and care even if there is no known effective therapy
or therapy is unavailable.
Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE Lj. 225, 229 (1960).
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able to provide such treatment for all the dangerously disordered; nor
are judicial decrees likely to produce the needed psychiatrists and
appropriations. The alternative is release of the palpably dangerous,
if treatment is to be a flat prerequisite for confinement.
The "no preventive detention" reading of Robinson could be rec-
onciled with the unwillingness of courts to free the dangerously insane
by a simple device--gutting the requirement of treatment. Confinement
for treatment could be read to mean confinement with an announced
intention to treat, coupled with an asserted willingness to provide
actual treatment as the needed knowledge, personnel, and money turns
up. This solution would have the comfortable virtue of coupling high
constitutional ideals to an almost total absence of inconvenient change
in a system of mass preventive detention.
If neither the drastic reading nor the hypocritical rejection of pre-
ventive detention commend themselves to the courts, Robinson can also
be read to tolerate civil confinement for dangerousness. Civil commit-
ment for mental disorder is distinguishable from imprisonment follow-
ing conviction. Imprisonment is accompanied by an officially sanctioned
and imposed stigma, rooted in the collective moral condemnation of
society. While a stigma doubtless attaches to mental illness as well as
sexual psychopathy and defective delinquency, at least an enlightened
minority within society accepts the official characterization of these
statuses as forms of sickness arising from no fault of the persons them-
selves.49 And, of course, the official characterization, particularly if ad-
hered to by deed as well as by word, may enlarge the enlightened sector
of society. Nor is a blanket indictment of public institutions for civil
confinement fair; some superior ones resemble general hospitals in both
facilities and atmosphere. Ultimately, whether the distinction between
imprisonment and civil commitment for dangerousness is of constitu-
tional magnitude will depend on the quality of public mental insti-
tutions.
Meanwhile, the Robinson decision throws no more than a shadow
punch at preventive detention. Indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas, who can
rarely be accused of lagging behind the Court, actually reaffirmed the
validity of confinement for protection of the public in his concurring
49. This stigma is supposed to result from the ceremony of conviction, and not necs.
sarily from confinement itselM Both Robinson and Easter emphasized the importance of
convicting the sick person to their condusion that he had been punished: "Cruel and
unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the addict of a
crime." 370 U.S. at 676 (concurring opinion). "[1t is the fact of criminal conviction that is
critical." 361 F.2d at 55. In most civil commitment cases, of course, there is no conviction.
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opinion. 50 Moreover, Robinson does not in terms extend to acts caused
by illness, as opposed to the illness itself. Yet restraint under insanity
defense laws and many psychopath statutes is triggered by anti-social
acts, although the condition of illness may be in whole or part the
determining factor. At least where the individual has by such actions
justified a reaction by society, Robinson loses some or all of its force.
B. Due Process
If the courts reject the Eighth Amendment assault upon civil confine.
ment without treatment, the constitutional issues of definition and
procedure mentioned in Rouse remain. Many of those detained in
institutions today were put away with little ceremony or under stan.
dards grossly vague in meaning. Lengthy civil commitment often results
from a brief and informal hearing before one or more psychiatrists.
Rouse's commitment, for example, was automatic after the judge con-
cluded there was reasonable doubt of his sanity at the time he had
committed the criminal acts charged; there was no hearing on the issues
of his continued dangerousness or treatability. Many would argue that
the standards applied in proceedings to commit for "sexual psycho.
pathy" or "defective delinquency" have no clear meaning, either scien-
tific or colloquial.51 If it were candidly admitted that these proceedings
were designed to confine individuals solely because they were danger-
ous, with no view toward curing or treating them, it is doubtful that
such loose standards and procedures could be constitutionally tolerated.
However, civil commitment statutes, sexual psychopath laws and the
like are not frankly called preventive detention measures. Rather they
are justified under the benevolent rubric of treatment and cure oE the
sick. Under this rubric, procedural constraints are slackened or dropped;
confinement follows, often with few of the indicia of treatment and
many of preventive detention. Indeed, many courts have not required
even the assertion of an intent to treat, but have been satisfied with a
determination that commitment statutes are civil in nature, or have a
regulatory rather than a penal purpose.12
An occasional court has looked behind the label "civil," or the asser-
tion of a curative 6r rehabilitative purpose, to examine what is actually
done to the person committed. In Gault, the Supreme Court held that
the due process clause required certain procedural safeguards akin to
50. -37 OUtS.at 676,
51* Sde loti 21 and 32 stiprd. .....
Si2. e c aes cited notes 22-30 supia.
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those traditional in criminal law for juvenile court cases, despite the
"civil" nature of the proceeding and the good intentions underlying
the juvenile court movement. Juvenile proceedings, found the Court,
are often very like criminal trials-they determine that a defendant has
committed an illegal act, and order his incarceration. 3 The social stigma
surrounding the status "juvenile delinquent," while not officially im-
posed in theory, is scarcely less damning than that attached to criminals.
Though the Court makes it clear that each civil process will carry its
own due process standard,54 the reasoning in Gault applies with almost
equal force to certain forms of confinement for mental disorder. Some
sexual psychopath and defective delinquent laws require proof of crim-
inal acts, and in their very names lurks a stigma which is, if anything,
worse than that imposed on criminals. Commitment of persons found
not guilty by reason of insanity has many of the same characteristics.
Even routine civil commitment, though not based upon an adjudica-
tion of past misdeeds, carries with it loss of liberty and a damaging
stigma.
Civil confinement laws diverge from juvenile proceedings where they
have the express purpose of treatment. "Treatment" is a more definite
and hopeful goal than the "rehabilitation" sought under the juvenile
laws; it connotes specific diseases and medically prescribed procedures
designed to cure them. One of the Court's objections to summary juve-
nile court procedures in Gault was the unproved and speculative nature
of the claims that the process "rehabilitated" its clients.-5
Rouse suggests that a similar realistic scrutiny may be in the offing
for the civil confinement process. Assertion of a benevolent purpose to
treat will not be enough; treatment will have to be provided if pro-
cedures are to be slighted. In this implication Rouse does not stand
alone. A few state courts have also had due process doubts about civil
53. 387 U.S. at 27. In reviewing disposition under juvenile statutes, courts in the District
of Columbia asserted an early kind of right to treatment, derived from concepts of due
process and the statutes themselves. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1954), held
that a juvenile not convicted of a crime could not be mingled with criminals in a federal
correctional facility. Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960), held that a juvenile
could not be held in a local jail after violating his parole. The court noted that constitu-
tional safeguards had been disregarded in juvenile proceedings, "[a]nd it seems funda-
mental to this Court ... that this disregard is warranted only if proper facilities are, in
fact furnished." Id. at 354. Gault simply carries this philosophy to its limits. More
recently, the D.C. Circuit has in terms extended the right to treatment to juveniles, holding
that a juvenile held for trial in juvenile court had a right to receive needed psychiatric
care, having been granted "a legal right to a custody that is not inconsistent with the
parens patriae premise of the law." Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 105, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
54. 387 U.S. at 13-14, 30.
55. 387 US. at 21-22.
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confinement. They have held that a sexual psychopath, never convicted
of a crime, could not be held in prison as part of his "treatment";60
that prisoners near the end of their terms could not be held indefinitely
in prison (awaiting establishment of a treatment center) when they were
found to be sex offenders; 57 and that judges before giving indeterminate
sentences to sex offenders should be "reasonably certain that treatment
will be given."5 8
These cases,69 taken with the dicta in Rouse, suggest the following
minimum constitutional limitations upon civil confinement for mental
disorder. First, if the state is to confine someone because he is danger-
ous, with no promise of treatment, it must do so under statutes with
clearly defined standards and with procedures approaching those of the
criminal process in rigor. The permissible standard for "dangerousness"
is a separate question, with constitutional dimensions of its own. States
should not be allowed, for example, to prove dangerousness solely by
showing commission of a minor property crime, or the prediction of
one.60 Second, where procedure is slighted, only a finding of treat-
56. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958). Maddox had been under treat-
ment at Ionia State Hospital, and challenged his confinement after being transferred to
the state prison. He was confined under nearly the same conditions as were regular
prisoners. Sending him back to the hospital, the court noted:
In the event that defendant were actually innocent of the offenses charged (and on
this record we have no right to presume the contrary), his right to proper medical
treatment would have been as badly violated by his imprisonment as his constitutional
rights.
Id. at 372, 88 N.W.2d at 477.
57. [t is necessary that the remedial aspect of confinement . ..have foundation in
fact. It is not sufficient that the Legislature announce a remedial purpose if the conse-
quences to the individual are penal. While we are not now called upon to state tie
standards which such a center must observe to fulfill its remedial purpose, we hold that
a confinement in a prison which is undifferentiated from the incarceration of convicted
criminals is not remedial so as to escape the requirements of due process. Commonwealth
v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 317-18, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959). The center was later set up, and
approved by the court in Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960).
See pp. 107-08 infra.
58. People v. Jackson, 20 App. Div. 2d 170, 174, 245 N.Y.S2d 534, 538 (1963). An inter-
esting aspect of the decision is the court's discussion of the problems New York encountered
in staffing its treatment program for sexual psychopaths, which was viewed as a progressive
reform in penology. Id. at 171-73, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 536-37.
59. However, some courts have rejected the due process arguments. In People ex rcl.
Anonymous v. La Burt, 14 App. Div. 2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1961) a New York court
refused to consider evidence on inadequate treatment, saying:
It is the policy of the state to care for and protect mentally ill persons and, if possible,
to cure them of disease .... But this policy does not confer on the mentally ill person
a right to release in the event of claimed inadequate treatment.
Id. at 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
60. Precisely what standards and procedures should be required is a question beyond
the scope of this Comment. In general, however, several kinds of decisions will have to be
made: (1) Whether basic procedural guarantees such as confrontation, notice, counsel, and
jury trial should apply. Common sense and Gault demand that they obtain in the danger.
ousness proceeding. (2) Where the burden of proof is to be placed. Considering the nature
of the proceeding, it should certainly be on the state, both on the mental disease and dan-
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ability61 and actual adequate treatment of the person committed can
justify continued detention.02
Such a limited right to treatment has certain advantages over the
more wholesale assault upon civil confinement implicit in any Eighth
Amendment challenge. It does not press courts into the dilemma of
either releasing dangerous individuals or so watering down the notion
of treatment as to have no effect on current practice. It allows the con-
finement of the dangerously insane, but under strict standards and
procedural safeguards. It allows informal confinement for treatment
where treatment is possible and actually available. And it requires the
treatment or release of the harmless and neglected.
An equal protection argument for a right to treatment, noticed by
Judge Bazelon in Rouse, and adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Sas v.
Maryland,63 seems conceptually only a special case of the due process
gerousness questions. (3) What quantum of proof should be required. The usual commit-
ment standard of "weight of the evidence" will not be enough as the dangerousness pro-
ceeding is separated and examined. Because of the nature of the judgments involved.
"beyond a reasonable doubt" may not be a practical alternative, and a point in-between
may be best. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III: Theories and Procedures,
79 HAnv. L. REv. 1288 (1966); Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for
Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. Cim. L. REv. 633, 654-59 (1967). (4)
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what kinds of acts are to provide the content for
the notion of dangerousness. Certain limits may have to be set dow-n in the statute itself.
or courts may have to exclude certain types of acts as insufficient in themsaelves. It would
not do, for example, for dangerousness to be made out on the prediction that the subject
will commit a misdemeanor if left free; the likelihood of physical harm to persons should
predominate. Where the allegation is that the respondent is dangerous to himself, the
notion of physical danger also predominates, with the proviso that helplessness raises a
presumption of that danger. See Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (any
"criminal act" enough); Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ('reasonably
foreseeable" danger); Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illnems: Some Observa-
tions on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225
(1960).
This same set of problems applies to the decision to release a person committed under
this system. Since treatment here is not the sine qua non of confinement, it is essential that
regular review of dangerousness be provided.
61. A detailed treatment plan need not be presented at this point, but the court should
require expert opinion that the subject's illness is amenable to treatment, and a showing
that a facility capable of providing treatment is available.
62. The scheme advocated here could operate in the context of one commitment statute,
but two separate procedures would seem preferable. This would make the dangerousness
proceeding, with its criminal-type procedural sufeguards, more visible, and leave the
treatment route like present medical certification, with the added requirement that both
treatability and the availability of facilities must be proved. This is not to suggest tiat
there be no attempt to treat those committed for dangerousness, but rather that lack of
treatment does not remove the state's right to confine in their case. Insuring their treat-
ment will have to be done without the weapon of court-ordered release, probably by non-
judicial efforts. See pp. 114-16 infra.
Where the individual is shown to be sufficiently dangerous to be committed, but also
treatable, difficult problems are presented. Perhaps courts could be armed with the power
to force the state to use the treatment route, or to use treatment orders short of outright
release.
63. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
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doctrine just outlined.64 In Sas, the Fourth Circuit suggested that Mary.
land's defective delinquent law discriminated against mentally dis-
turbed defendants by confining them for indeterminate periods to a
state hospital, while "normal" persons convicted of the same crimes
received determinate sentences; the distinction could only be justified
if actual treatment were provided in the institution for defectives. A
due process rationale would require either that actual treatment be
provided the defectives, or that they be shown to be dangerous in some
way that ordinary criminals are not, under clearly defined standards
and with procedural safeguards close to those of the criminal process.
Civil commitment for dangerousness, however, does fulfill the primary
equal protection requirement of a rational classification. The "sen-
tence" is indeterminate because of a finding that the defendant is
dangerous in a sense beyond that implied by his conviction. The dan-
gerousness is presumed to stem from affected behavior controls, which
cannot be expected to respond to punishment in any fixed length of
time. If the Eighth Amendment argument is rejected, this justifies
further preventive detention.65
III. Enforcing a Right to Treatment
If either the cruel and unusual punishment or the due process
rationale is adopted, courts will face the problem of defining the stan-
dard of treatment which justifies continued confinement.6 0 The multi.
plicity of possible treatments and the institutional incompetence of
courts to evaluate them in detail require a careful effort to sort out
legal issues appropriate for judicial decision and medical issues best
left to experts in that profession.
A. Which Right to Treatment?
In Rouse Judge Bazelon tentatively defines the standard for treat-
ment as that adequate "in light of present knowledge." 07 But this stan-
dard is not found in the statute upon which the decision is based, nor
is it the only plausible one. Why not treatment adequate in the light
64. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), for example, the denial of equal pro-
tection lay in committing the prisoner without the due process hearing received by the
ordinary committed person. This is consistent with the theory here advanced.
65. See Judge Bazelon's comment in Williams, quoted supra note 39.
66. If the right to treatment is never put on constitutional grounds, but remains a
creature of statute, the following discussion would still be relevant in the process of
administering it.
67. 373 F.2d at 456.
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of the state's abilities or in the light of the resources allocated by the
state for that purpose? Why not some treatment, with virtually any
colorable treatment satisfying the requirement? Finally, why not the
right to one particular form of treatment as opposed to another?
Judge Bazelon noted in his Rouse opinion that the possibility of
better treatment does not mean that one being provided is inadequate,08
and indeed it would be a serious mistake for courts to undertake to
determine and require the "best" treatment. Judge Bazelon does, how-
ever, seem to envision courts choosing between therapies on the basis of
their relative adequacy and the patient's particular needs.r3 But courts
may be ill-suited to choose among competing schools of psychotherapy.
What is needed is a workable definition of responsible treatment which
judges can apply to curb negligent or palpably inappropriate treatment
without unduly encouraging litigation or straitjacketing the medical
profession.
Upon examining the literature of psychotherapy, one is immediately
struck by the bewildering array of schools of thought, theories, and
points of view concerning therapeutic techniques, few with enough
empirical support to justify conclusive assertions about their effective-
ness.70
The most effective form of therapy for many disorders, one-to-one
communication between patient and doctor over an extended period,
is probably impossible for state hospitals to use except with selected
patients. The typical state institution has thousands of patients; individ-
ual therapy would require a staggering number of psychiatrists and
psychologists. Unless massive additional resources are devoted to this
task, psychotherapy will never be available on an individual basis to
more than a minority of state patients.71
Various forms of group therapy are offered in the state hospitals,
though they are necessarily limited in the number of participants ac-
commodated at any one time.72 Occupational therapy is available, but
varies from meaningful job training to little more than hard labor. Its
effectiveness in treating certain types of disorders is advocated by a
68. Id. at 456-57.
69. Id. at 456.
70. For a series of volumes on current practices and new therapeutic ideas see Cura=, r
PsYCHIATRIc THERAPIEs, vols. 1-4 (J. Masseran ed. 1961-64).
71. Cumming, Cumming, Kennard & Hoffman, Social Structure and Patient Care in the
Large, Public Mental Hospital, in TiE PATINr AND THE IENTAL HOSPiAL 36, 38 (Mf. Green-
blatt, D. Levinson & R. Williams eds. 1957). On the difficulties of the large-scale use of
psychoanalysis see ACTiON FOR MENTAL HEAiLT 79-80.
72. See generally R. White, THE An[oaAL PErsoNALrry 343-50 (3d ed. 196-4) [herein-
after cited as WVHIT], and sources cited.
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responsible segment of the psychiatric community.7 Recreational
therapy is in widespread use, and has been found to be of some value.
In some hospitals experimentation is carried out with psychodrama, a
form of therapy in which patients prepare and stage scenes for other
patients and staff.
Drugs are administered freely in most state hospitals, though gener-
ally for quieting patients and making them more amenable to other
types of therapy, rather than as a separate form of treatment.7 4 Various
types of somatic therapies, such as insulin shock and electro-convulsive
therapy, also have their adherents, especially in the treatment of psy-
choses which are acute or of sudden onset.78 The continuing research
into the nature of mental illness, moreover, produces and will con.
tinue to produce a constant stream of new therapies-chemical, physi-
cal, and psychological. The efficacy of these modes of treatment is
often hotly disputed, and the debates reflect the inconclusive evidence
advanced by the theorists who tout either the psychological or the
physiological origin of mental disease.7 6
As if the problem of deciding which, if any, of these therapies nmay
be adequate for a specific individual were not difficult enough, other
ways of dealing with mental disorder are sometimes responsibly advo-
cated as therapies. Some doctors feel that punishment itself is treat-
ment for some anti-social individuals, or that it will at least make them
more likely to accept other forms of treatment77-a theory which, if
carried too far, could render any constitutional right to treatment
meaningless. Far more common is the assertion that simple custody of
the mental patient, away from society and its stresses and free from
day-to-day responsibility, is treatment. Thus it might be possible to
argue that the simple custody, herein contrasted with treatment, has
itself the same beneficial effect on the individual and thus justifies
detention.
Another school of fairly recent origin has transformed many Amer-
ican mental institutions through what is variously called environ-
73. See, e.g., Conte, Occupational Therapy in the Psychoses, in 2 CURRENT PsYIcIATRIa
THERAPEs 227 (J. Masserman ed. 1962).
74. See generally AMnoN FOR MENTAL HEALTh 39-46; Wunfs 47, 506-07, and sources cited;
Lehman, The Psychotropic Drugs: Their Actions and Applications, 2 HosPrTAL PRAcricL
74 (1967).
75. See generally WHiTE 45-47, 504-06, and sources cited.
76. On one important battleground in the continuing dispute-the source of schizo.
phrenia--see N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1966, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
77. The state psychiatrist argued this in the Maddox case. 351 Mich. at 365-66, 88
N.W.2d at 474. It is also suggested by the court's findings in Daniels. 243 Md. at 58.59,
221 A.2d at 422. On the historical notion of punishment as treatment see AaoN FoR
MENTAL HEALTH 25-28.
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mental or milieu therapy.7 8 This approach entails a recognition that
the hospital social structure itself can be a powerful force for rehabili-
tation of the mentally ill. Morris S. Schwartz has summarized the
system in these terms:
Descriptive adjectives that are used to designate a "therapeutic"
social structure include: Democratic (as compared with authori-
tarian); treatment-oriented (as contrasted with custodial-oriented);
humanitarian (instead of oppressive); flexible (as opposed to
rigid).7 9
The movement toward these objectives has meant opening more
wards, liberalizing and civilizing the patient's living patterns, and
allowing therapeutic roles to be performed by nurses and other staff
members. There is some controversy over whether this sort of program
is really treatment at all, or merely a precondition or a setting for
treatment. The movement nonetheless exerts a powerful influence on
contemporary thought. Its characteristics are so flexible and general
that it may often be found in bogus form, making the job of deter-
mining adequacy of treatment even more difficult.80
B. Judicial Supervision of Treatment
How then is a court to decide whether a person has been adequately
treated or is receiving treatment now? In this field judges will have
but meager standards to guide them if they attempt to supervise the
treatment process by choosing one type of treatment over another. 81
78. The terms are often misused, and perhaps refer more properly to an altitude about
treatment than to a specific body of techniques. The notion of milieu therapy can be dis-
torted by simply labelling custodial functions, in fact any contact with the patient, a
part of the therapeutic environment, without any real change in the attitude toward
treatment.
The literature on milieu therapy is becoming voluminous. For a brief but useful view of
the therapeutic program at the Yale Psychiatric Institute, one of the leaders in milieu
techniques, see PsYcHoANALYsis, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 659-64. See generally J. CuING &
E. CtmmaNG, Eco AN'D Miuu (1963); M. EDELSON, EcO PSYCHOLO Y, GRouP Dv, ., cs AND
THE THERAPuTic M=u (1954); M. GREENBLATr, R. YORE & E. BRoWN, From CUsTODIAL TO
THERAunc CARE IN .mTAL HosPrrATs (1955); M. JONES, TuE T EAPEunc ComIuNI
(1953); THE PATrENT AND Tim M TwAL HosPrrAL (M. Greenblatt, D. Levinson & R. Williams
eds. 1957); A. STANTON & Mf. ScszwARTz, THE MENTAL HosPrrAL (1954).
79. Schwartz, What is a Therapeutic Milieu?, in Tim PATmnT AND Tie MENTAL HOSPITAL
130 (M. Greenblatt, D. Levinson & R. Williams eds. 1957).
80. See note 78 supra. See also Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilita-
tive Ideal, 50 J. Cmi. L.G. & P.S. 226, 229 (1959).
81. Improvement of the patient, of course, is not a reliable index of whether he is
being treated, at least within reasonable time limits. Studies have shom that for some
disorders there is a spontaneous remission rate as high as 20 per cent without any treatment.
AcnoN FOR MENTAL HEALTH 52. On the other hand, some patients ill not recover no
matter what treatment is attempted.
Whether a given patient receives a given treatment is a product of many factors, includ-
ing the availability of facilities, the patient's age, his intelligence, his social class, and the
kinds of treatments being administered to others in the hospital.
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If they take a conservative view, experimental techniques may be dis-
couraged; if they view the choice too broadly, few patients will ever
be able to prove they are not being treated adequately.
Few courts have plunged into the difficult area of evaluating treat-
ment and treatment facilities. In Commonwealth v. Hogan,82 the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the adequacy of the
State's treatment facilities for sex offenders. The defendant was con-
fined in a closed wing of the state hospital for the criminally insane,
with some separate staff but occasional mingling with other inmates.
The court reiterated an earlier holding that mere incarceration under
the statute would violate due process, but found that the treatment
center envisioned "had foundation in fact."83 The opinion did not
inquire deeply into the requirements for treatment, consider psy-
chiatric sources, or examine the specific treatment being given Hogan.
It seemed satisfied with the mere fact that a recognizably separate facil-
ity had in fact been established. It did note that the center left much
to be desired, adding:
We cannot assume that the necessary action to establish a fully
adequate treatment center, already begun, will not be carried to
completion. If it should later appear that it has not, a different
question will be presented.8 4
Recently the Maryland courts have made a more searching inquiry
into the adequacy of treatment. In Director of Patuxent Institution v.
Daniels85 the court of appeals adopted a lower court opinion upholding
the adequacy of treatment provided in the state institution for de-
fective delinquents. In the course of the trial, eight days of oral
testimony was received from eminent experts such as Dr. Karl Men-
ninger, Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, Dr. Philip Roche, and Dr. Jerome
Frank; some 64 printed or written exhibits concerning the operation
of Patuxent Institution were also introduced. The inquiry was not as
specific as that demanded in Rouse; the court did not examine Daniels'
particular diagnosis or the treatment he was receiving at the institu-
tion. Instead it was content to examine treatment methods generally
to determine whether they brought the institution above the level of
82. 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960). After the court's decision in Page, the state set
up a facility for sex offenders, and in Hogan the court reconsidered its ruling in light of
that fact. See note 57 supra.
83. 341 Mass. at 377, 170 N.E.2d at 330, quoting from Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass.
at 317, 159 N.E.2d at 85.
84. 341 Mass. at 377, 170 N.E.2d.at 330.
85. 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
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the merely penal. The court also was willing to look more to the
legislative ideal than to reality, asking only
whether or not the act is reasonably calculated to achieve its legis-
lative purpose, leaving for the legislative and executive branches
of the government a determination of whether in fact it is accom-
plishing its legislative purpose.80
The Rouse opinion does acknowledge the problem of standards and
suggests several ways out of the judicial morass:
Counsel for the patient and the government can be helpful in
presenting pertinent data concerning standards for medical care,
and ... the court may appoint independent experts. Assistance
might be obtained from such sources as the American Psychiatric
Association, which has published standards and is continually en-
gaged in studying the problems of mental care. The court could
also consider inviting the psychiatric and legal communities to
establish procedures by which expert assistance can be best
provided.87
These methods, however, may not be adequate to the purpose. If a
patient is simply locked up in a cell and never seen by hospital staff
members, the decision will be relatively easy (unless the claim is that
he is receiving punishment therapy), but what if the doctors testify
at length that a patient is receiving recreational therapy and is living
in a therapeutic milieu which is reforming his shattered ego? Judge
Bazelon seems to feel that standards or categories can be developed to
label milieu therapy adequate for certain types of disorders and not
for others, but difficulties are apparent. There will be a significant
divergence of expert opinion on the questions of appropriateness and
effectiveness, 88 and undoubtedly much reluctance on the part of psy-
86. Id. at 41, 221 A.2d at 411.
87. 373 F.2d at 457 (footnotes omitted).
88. Just as there is controversy among psychiatrists over the meaning of mental illness
itself, particularly concerning such fringe disorders as psychopathy. See note 21 supra. On
the concept of mental illness see B. WoorroN, SOCIAL ScIENE AND SOCAL Pf oLtocy cl. NqI
(1959); M. JAHODA, CURRENT CONCEPTS OF PosrriT_-vEN-rAL HE4LTt (1958).
Diagnoses of mental disorder often differ widely, as almost any case in which the insanity
defense is raised will show. This was true in the Rouse case. Ridgeway. Who's Fit to be
Free?, NEw REPUBLC, Feb. 4, 1967, at 24-26.
There is also disagreement over whether a given diagnosis constitutes a mental disease or
defect, and this problem has contributed to the criticism of the Durham rule. The broad-
ened insanity defense turned the law's attention, rightly or wrongly, touard disase
entities, many of which are not learly enough delineated. The opposition of so many
courts and legislatures to such a standard can be traced in part to a recognition of the
vagueness of the definition of mental illness and the lack of dear standards for making
judgments about it. Insofar as this criticism is well-founded, and it has been widely
articulated, it is even more relevant to the determination of adequacy under a right to
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chiatrists to confine and narrow the applicability of the various modes
of treatment. There are no easy standards, except in the grossest cases
of neglect. Even the American Psychiatric Association standards sug-
gested by the court s do not compare therapies but merely set out man-
power requirements for adequacy; significantly, no state hospital in
the country presently meets these requirements.90
In response to the call for assistance in the Rouse opinion, and prob-
ably in some alarm over its possible consequences, the American Psy-
chiatric Association recently released a position statement on the
adequacy of treatment. 91 It contends that "[tjhe definition of treat-
ment and the appraisal of its adequacy are matters for medical
determination," 92 but sets down seven considerations relevant in deter-
mining whether a patient is receiving adequate treatment: (1) The
purpose of hospitalization, and differences between, for example, long-
term and short-term treatment programs; (2) The degree to which
treatment is revised as diagnosis develops during institutionalization;
(3) The need to protect the patient from self-inflicted harm; (4) The
importance of interrupting the disease process, as in separating the
addict from his drugs or the psychotic from his family stress situation;
(5) The effective use of physical therapies; (6) Efforts to change the
emotional climate around the patient, which seems to mean roughly
milieu therapy and related measures; and (7) The availability of con-
ventional psychological therapies. 3 The statement goes on to stress the
importance of considering the limitations of the staff and facilities at
hand, and the need for cooperation by the patient in his treatment
treatment. See Judge Burger's comments concurring in Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d
853, 857-62 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and those of Judge Weintraub in State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 82,
152 A.2d 50, 74 (1959) (concurring opinion).
For a case graphically illustrating the dilemma of a court faced with two widely diver-
gent expert views on proper treatment, raised in the context of incompetence to stand
trial, see United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1963):
Mental disorders being what they are, it is not surprising that eminent psychiatrists
differ as to methods of treatment. Here, Dr. Shoenfeld believed that Klein would
respond to a psychoanalytic form of therapy; Dr. Douglas, by his own testimony,
favored a more physiological approach. Courts of law, unschooled in the intricacies of
what may be the most perplexing of medical sciences, are ill-equipped to choose among
such divergent but responsible views. In a case such as this, where a man's llfe may
literally hang in the balance, a judge ought not undertake the hazardous venture of
changing the course of psychiatric treatment without, at the least, a much fuller
hearing and a far greater preponderance of expert testimony than existed here (foot-
notes omitted).
89. AMERiCAN PsycAumc ASSOCLATION, STANDARDS FOR HOSPITALS AND CLINICS (1958).
90. 373 F.2d at 458.
91. American Psychiatric Association, A Position Statement on the Question of Ade.
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program.94 While it certainly provides some guidance, this framework
leaves too much discretion to the hospital and too little substance to
the right to treatment.
The court in Rouse suggests an analogy to malpractice cases to but-
tress its conclusion that judgments of adequacy of treatment are man-
ageable.95 The expensive and inconclusive battles of experts, followed
by grab-bag jury verdicts, which mark those cases do not make a happy
precedent. And in physical medicine there is relative certainty com-
pared with psychotherapy, both in diagnosis and in the efficacy of
particular treatments. In the psychiatric malpractice field, the courts
have exhibited extreme reluctance to examine the issues of treatment
and great confusion in trying to decide when negligence has occurred.
Most of the cases involve such matters as discharge or failure to prevent
escape from an institution, not the superiority of one treatment over
another.96 Moreover, the malpractice field has at least one legal issue
with which courts have grappled in other contexts and feel at home,
if only to a limited degree-negligence. In the right to treatment cases
even this touchstone will be absent, and courts may well feel even
further at sea amidst conflicting expert opinion. 7
Another perplexing problem is whether the court should consider
the state's capabilities and resources. Bazelon says in Rouse that "[c]on-
94. Id. 1459, 1460.
95. 373 F.2d at 457 n.30.
96. See the cases and materials in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCiIATR AND L*,,Lv 728-51. When
the patient sues the doctor or the hospital for negligent treatment, as in the shock cases,
there is no comparison of treatments but rather an examination of how the particular treat-
ment was administered. Cf. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1959).
97. The proceedings in the district court upon remand of the first Rouse case give a
glimpse of what the process is like, though in that case the judge was obviously uns)m-
pathetic with the concept. Counsel for Rouse obtained a foundation grant and with it
procured the assistance of two acknowledged experts in hospital therapy, who testified
to inadequacies in the treatment program of St. Elizabeths in Rouse's case. Judge Holtzoff
applied malpractice principles to decide whether treatment was defective, though it seems
clear that they are not alone sufficient for the kind of examination Judge Bazelon had in
mind. The thrust of the controversy was the adequacy of the hospital's milieu therapy
program. Judge Holtzoff thought the lack of testimony on accepted standards of treatment
in state hospitals was fatal; opinions that in certain hospitals better treatment would be
available were not enough:
There was some testimony introduced to the effect that in the opinion of the super-
intendent of another hospital, that other hospital had better treatment than Saint
Elizabeths hospital. The Court was not going to pass judgment as to comparisons
between hospitals any more than it would as to comparisons between doctors.
Rouse v. Cameron, H.C. No. 287-65, transcript at 411 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1957). Reviewng the
American Psychiatric Association standards, Holtzoff found the staff ratios to be adequate.
He noted that the patient had not received individual therapy, adding:
Inhere is no evidence in this case that in public mental institutions it is a recog-
nized standard that there should be enough ph)sicians to give individual treatment
to every patient that can be benefitted by it.
Id. at 416. Holtzoff's conclusion was that treatment had been adequate.
III
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tinuing failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment cannot be
justified by lack of staff or facilities."08 He recognizes "that shortage
of psychiatric personnel is a most serious problem today in the care
of the mentally ill,"' 99 but feels that the right is too important to be
qualified in this way. His position seems basically sound; the result of
a finding that inadequate treatment is available will normally be
either release or, for those for whom the state wishes to prove suffi-
cient dangerousness, a full hearing under due process standards. For
courts who interpret the right to treatment as requiring only an ac-
cepted treatment, and not the best one, it is reasonable to ignore the
state's abilities. But care must be taken not to define "adequate treat.
ment" so that it will be impossible for any hospital to provide it100
The meaning of the constitutional command to treat, if such there
be, is not that courts must assume the role of forcing the psychiatric pro-
fession toward an ideal but unrealizable system, but that bona fide
treatment be made available. There is some danger that in insensitive
hands this right can backfire by forcing a retreat from the attempt to
rehabilitate that has marked much of recent social history. If too high
a standard of treatment is imposed, less conscientious states may desire
to abandon all pretense of providing public treatment and confine
their mental health programs to preventive detention of the dangerous.
States would not be free to define "dangerousness" in any way they
chose for commitment purposes, however.101 Yet another danger is that
the states, faced with the prospect of having to release, say, treatable
property offenders, might use habitual offender statutes to accomplish
the same end.10 2
Another problem arises if the state claims that the patient's unwill-
ingness to accept treatment, and not hospital shortcomings, prevents
adequate treatment. 10 3 This was one of the answers given by the
hospital in Rouse's case. It will obviously not do to allow the state to
avoid its responsibilities indefinitely on these grounds. If the patient
98. 373 F.2d at 457.
99. Id. at 458.
100. Insofar as the profession articulates its current standards of adequacy, they will
reflect present limitations of resources, which inevitably influence judgments of how much
treatment, or what kind or treatment, is proper.
101. See note 60 supra.
102. Indeterminate sentencing laws, which are becoming more popular, could also be
attacked on the Rouse rationale if the rehabilitation upon which release depends is not
offered by the state. Like habitual offender statutes, they show the continuity of "civil" and
"criminal" detention methods, and may have to be controlled if we are to insist tpon the
reality of the rehabilitative ideal. See generally A. GoLDSTmN, TnE INsANrry DErNsi.
(1967).
103. As a medical matter, the patient's willingness to cooperate in treatment is often
crucial. G. HOLLAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF PsYcHoTHERAPY 36 (1965); Wurm 313.
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can successfully reject all treatment, then under our analysis he must
either be released or given his fair hearing if dangerousness can be
established. Of course, a different problem is presented if the patient
profits by treatment despite strenuously opposing it.
Even where the patient rejects and cannot profit from treatment,
there may be cases where the patient's doctors require a certain period
of time to interrupt the disease process and change the patient's world-
view sufficiently to allow the beginning of therapy. 04 In such situa-
tions, the rejection of treatment is part of a larger, and more properly
medical judgment-the timing of treatment. As the American Psy-
chiatric Association statement indicates, this interruption and re-
orientation period can be crucial as a prelude to treatment. In these
cases, which will ordinarily be confined to the first stages of institu-
tionalization, courts must scrutinize the appropriateness of the initial
period of inactive therapy and limit its duration by allowing a habeas
corpus petition to be reinstated after a certain time has elapsed. They
must also be alert, of course, for situations in which the supposed delay
is nothing more than custodial confinement, with no clear plans for the
future; but by the same token they must not prematurely release
patients for whom reasonable and adequate treatment plans have been
made.
A final argument state authorities may make is that a given patient
is not receiving treatment because he is untreatable10 5 Some types of
psychotics 0 6 and many psychopaths 07 are not now susceptible to treat-
ment in the true psychiatric sense. This claim should not suffice either.
A precondition of commitment for treatment is a finding of treat-
ability. The untreatable patient must be released or, with the necessary
procedural safeguards and strict definitional standards, committed for
dangerousness.
104. This is particularly true of individual psychotherapy. On phases of treatment, sec
THE PATIENT AND THE MENTAL HOsPITAL 174 (M. Greenblatt, D. Levinson & R. Williams
eds. 1957).
105. A study of two hospitals in large eastern states indicated that doctors felt only
between 10 and 25 per cent of patients could benefit from psychotherapy at any given time.
but much of this must be attributed to poverty of facilities. Note, Hospilalization of
Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 U. PA. I. Rnv. 78, 85.88 (1961).
106. Organic cases represent one such class. As to schizophrenia, see S. Amurt, Lw'm,-
PRETATION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 480 (1955).
107. Since psychopaths typically feel no anxiety about their conduct, motivation for
therapy is often missing. Many hospitals do not even like to admit psychopaths because
they can be a disrupting influence. For current efforts, see 2 CuRE%,,r Psm cuLtmzC TnEUMES
180-83 (J. Masserman ed. 1962). See also the extended discussion of the efforts and success of
Maryland's treatment program in Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daiels, 243 Md. 16,
221 A.2d 397 (1966).
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The difficulty of judicially determining adequacy of treatment im-
poses practical limits on the scope of court review. Courts should con-
centrate on finding whether an adequate treatment program is present,
not on what is the best possible method of therapy.108 Using all the
expert opinion available, judges should adopt manageable criteria for
judging adequacy. Courts or juries should not be called upon to settle
genuine disputes between experts as to whether a given course of treat-
ment meets a judicially defined standard of adequacy. Where a substan-
tial body of independent opinion exists indicating that a certain form of
therapy is sound for the type of patient before the court, the treatment
should be found adequate.
The factor of independence should be stressed, however; the word of
the state's mental hospital staff should not be taken against the united
opinion of the profession. When professional opinion is not united,
the task is certainly more difficult, but the court should discount the
arguments of "house doctors" by a factor that may well vary with the
quality of the house. Forms of "therapy" apparently derived from the
institutional pressure to change state hospitals as little as possible
should be viewed with particular suspicion.
IV. Conclusion
The difficulties inherent in judicial implementation of a right to
treatment suggest that courts should perhaps limit their role in the
mental health process to that of strategic intervenor, using constitu.
tional doctrine to spur public adoption of more suitable means of
control. As in the area of police practices, constitutional doctrines can
be framed as an invitation to legislative reform. 09
The job of determining adequacy of treatment could perhaps be
108. In one sense this would be a two-stage process, since it will be necessary to decide
whether an adequate type of treatment is being attempted, and whether the attempt is being
carried out adequately. There are indications that the D.C. Circuit may be developing Its
definition of adequacy cautiously:
We do not suggest that the court should or can decide what particular treatment this
patient requires. The court's function here resembles ours when we review agency
action. We do not decide whether the agency has made the best possible decision, but
only make sure that it has made a permissible and reasonable decision in view of the
relevant information and within a broad range of discretion.
Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
109. In Miranda the Court made clear its hope that states would explore alternatives:
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional strait jacket which will handicap sound
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and
the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting
the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of the criminal law.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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performed best by an independent administrative agency. In many states
today inmates' complaints are heard by a state Mental Health Com-
mission, which itself administers the state's hospital system.u o What
may be needed is an agency composed of legal and psychiatric experts,
freed from administrative burdens and independent of hospital admini-
strators, clothed with real power to hear complaints about inadequate
treatment and to act upon them.
New York's recently adopted commitment system suggests what an
administrative solution might look like. There patients involuntarily
committed have automatic renewal hearings, and the state cannot
continue to restrain unless it can once again prove mental illness or
dangerousness.":' Review of the treatment process could be provided
on such a basis, with courts exercising their normal powers of review
over the agency's action.
An administrative solution might make a right to treatment more
meaningful for the patient by eliminating some of the burdens at-
tendant upon the judicial method of habeas corpus petitions. In order
to assert his right to adequate treatment effectively in court, the often
ignorant and indigent patient must know of the availability of the writ,
and be able to procure counsel and psychiatric witnesses in his behalf.
Under an administrative system with a requirement of periodic
renewal of authority for restraint by the state, the burden of justifying
continued detention would be shifted to the state. The cost to society
of providing fair representation and expert help to the patient might
be lessened by using relatively informal administrative proceedings.
Whether courts or administrative agencies perform the task of re-
viewing treatment, the problems of fashioning appropriate orders must
be faced. Successful prosecution of the writ of habeas corpus has tra-
ditionally meant release from illegal custody, but in Rouse Judge
Bazelon makes it clear that he does not consider the court restricted to
that single disposition. He discusses the alternatives to release, and the
considerations making each appropriate."-
For those persons the state can prove sufficiently dangerous 13 to
meet constitutional requirements for preventive detention, confine-
ment may be continued after a full hearing. The agency supervising
treatment may, in addition, be clothed with powers to require treat-
110. Eg., Nmv Yore MEi.'rAL. HYGIENE LAw § 86 & n.6 (McKinney 1951).
111. Id. § 73 (McKinney, Supp. 1967).
112. 373 F.2d at 458-59.
113. See notes 60-61 supra.
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ment, even though release is not the alternative for this class of patients.
For patients committed solely because of the need for treatment, several
kinds of orders might be appropriate. Courts at least should avoid
ordering specific types of treatment where one adequate form of
therapy is already being employed. On the other hand, where no treat-
ment or palpably mistaken treatment is being administered, the super-
vising body may want to order specified or unspecified treatment and
maintain jurisdiction to insure that its order is carried out. It may
order transfer to a different institution where appropriate treatment
is available, including the out-patient and clinic facilities now being
developed. 114 The power to release if adequate treatment is not forth-
coming remains the residual remedy.
114. See Lake v. Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967). The court of appeals, finding
that Mrs. Lake was senile and prone to wandering, ordered an inquiry into a disposition
other than commitment to St. Elizabeth's. The district court found that there were no
other appropriate facilities in the area:
The requirement of constant supervision necessarily restricts the availability of other
alternative courses of treatment .... This reality precludes this Court from ordering
her to accept community mental health and day care services, from ordering her to
accept various family service agency services, or neighborhood supervision, or part-
time supervision from social workers in petitioner's neighborhood.
Id. at 159. Noting that the court of appeals wanted the lower court's inquiry to uncover
the needs for new facilities, the court added:
While the opinion of the majority speaks mainly in terms of facilities, the statute
speaks in terms of treatment. To be sure, the facility may be an element of treatment,
but the facility as an entity itself, does not appear approachable under the statute.
Id. at 160.
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